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ARMY WAR COLLEGE

7 June 1960

is:

I. Essential task facing us today ~~are~~:

To analyze as best we can the probable policy and actions of the USSR and Communist China over the immediate future in the light of recent developments, and prepare measures to meet them.

It is obvious that if our problems with the Communist Bloc could be resolved peacefully, other issues from Cuba to Laos, from Berlin to Black Africa would become far more manageable.

But with Soviet, Communist China and their satellites competing with the Free World for every inch of the uncommitted world, and even trying to subvert countries in the Free World, the struggle will continue to be an intense one; although it may well remain "peaceful" - in the sense of short of nuclear war.

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Must recognize whatever the temporary tactics, long term objective of International Communism is to bury us.

They openly preach that Communism is the wave of the future - that just as our present capitalistic free enterprise society succeeded feudalism, so Communism will swallow up capitalism.

Khrushchev suggests this can be for us a peaceful and painless development.

No secret that the Communists in Moscow and Peiping propose to help along in every way possible to them what they conceive to be this wave of the future.

II. If this is so, and I fundamentally believe it to be, why should Khrushchev have started out several years ago on his program of co-existence and a relaxation of tensions?

Primarily he felt he needed to buy time for these purposes:

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(1) First, to realize his seven year plan and to develop his economic and industrial base to a point where successful competition for world domination became feasible in time of peace and where, in event of war, he could emerge successful.

(2) Second, to complete his missile program and to provide adequate protection to his homeland, both against our bombers and maybe also against missiles. (The anti-missile missile).

(3) Third, to secure, during this period of relaxation, working bases, political and economic, in the uncommitted world, particularly in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Black Africa and Latin America. (Mention Iraq - Laos - Indonesia - Guinea - Cuba.)

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(4) Fourth, to drive a wedge in NATO and other Free World alliances by creating the impression that it was no longer necessary to ally against Communism, and that U.S. was leading alliances toward nuclear war.

(5) Fifth, to get the United States out of Europe and out of overseas bases; this to be accomplished through realizing objectives mentioned in last point.

(6) Sixth, to soften us up, to slacken our military preparedness, by selling us "sweetness and light".

(7) Seventh, hopefully to get trade going between the Communist World and the Free World so that they could press on their industrial development more effectively by obtaining prototypes, machinery, plans and equipment from the West.

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There well may be other reasons such as realization of his promise to his people re living standards. These together constitute quite a program.

III. Communist China never believed in this policy of Co-existence with the West. While it desired some of the same objectives that Khrushchev desired through his co-existence program, they differed fundamentally: - both as to the extent of the danger of this program to Communist society and to its ultimate effectiveness.

(Discuss Sino-Soviet problem.)

IV. Khrushchev probably understood that his co-existence program inherently involved risks to his form of Government, to Communism itself. - Still he felt that these could be kept within manageable proportions.

What were these risks?

a. Opening up to the Soviet contact with the outside world both human contacts and contacts to all forms of news media and the like.

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b. This in turn permitted the Soviet people to realize what free societies had accomplished, what they meant in terms of liberty and opportunity for the individual.

c. This also carried the implication to the Soviet peoples that a compromise was possible between capitalism and Communism, between freedom and slavery. It implied that our free societies were not all bad, that our leaders were people with whom he could deal.

d. All this, coupled with the massive progress of education in the Soviet Union especially over the past decade, tended to show the Soviet people that there was an alternative, and a workable alternative, to Communism, tended to make them question basic tenets of Communist philosophy, to make some of them chafe at having to live in a closed society.

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When Wendell Wilkie visited the Soviet Union during the war and studied the Soviet educational system, he suggested to Stalin that he was likely to educate himself out of a job. Stalin laughed. Khrushchev has been pondering.

V. This was background of situation as Khrushchev prepared for the Summit and the President's visit to the Soviet Union.

If he could have wrung concessions out of the Summit on Berlin and disarmament -- or if without that he could have broken the unity of the Western Powers, the Summit and the President's visit with all its disadvantages might have been a plus. If, however, he failed in this and yet the Conference and the visit took place, the plus might have been turned into a minus.

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VI. It seems clear that during the weeks preceding the Summit Conference, issues such as above were vigorously debated in the Kremlin - the pro and cons of "co-existence".

Meanwhile the evidence was accumulating that Khrushchev at Summit would have little chance of breaking up the Western solidarity over Berlin or in a major way over disarmament.

(Refer speeches Herter, Dillon)

Hiw own pre-Summit speeches, particularly at Baku reverted to the tough line possibly evidencing that the tough group in the Kremlin was having its influence on him, or that he had more to compromise with them; maybe his co-existence program was a "ploy" rather than a policy. For Khrushchev is tough.

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VII. Into this situation came the U-2 incident. From May 1 to May 5, four full days during which Khrushchev said nothing, there must have been a debate in the Kremlin as to whether to remain quiet about the incident, to shove it under the rug as it were, or to build it up. To advertise the flight risked baring to Soviet people our ability to overfly, and some breach with West.

First statement on May 5 showed decision to publicize incident -- but still no clew as to how far they would go.

Second statement -- May 7 -- indicated decision to make an incident out of U-2. At this point Mikoyan went off on vacation.

The result of May 7 statement in turn forced hand in Washington -- with the official acknowledgment of high authority for the flights.

VIII. Here introduce my brief to Congress.

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IX. The influence of the U-2 flight on the Summit.

Undoubtedly the excuse; questionable whether the basic cause.

Have already indicated that Khrushchev had opportunities to take other course -- Between May 1 - 5 before first disclosure made.

Then again in Paris - after President stated flights stopped and would not be resumed.

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K Feared to proceed with Paris Conference in face of Allied unity - and probably disunity in Kremlin.

A "Breakup" over Berlin that loomed ahead - was dangerous for Khrushchev's prestige at home - might force his hand prematurely in Berlin.

But break up on basis breach with U.S.A. also had disadvantages - Khrushchev had stressed his "good" relations with the President - boasted he was man to deal with U.S.A.

Soviet people liked this.

Khrushchev's first "ploy" was that he "deceived" by the President. This didn't go down well at home - made Khrushchev seem naive.

Next ploy the CRUDE remarks re the President not in "control".

This ploy won't go down at home and makes Khrushchev ridiculous in rest of world.

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Khrushchev seems to have lost touch and timing.

The picture of Khrushchev in Paris - flanked by MALINOWSKI and GROMYKO - previously treated as lackeys - astounding.

Hard to escape conclusion that Khrushchev in some sort of trouble. He has lost face and his intemperate remarks show it

/ With all his bluster - inferiority complex vis-a-vis West /

Dictators cannot openly admit failure. Khrushchev despite apparent control of Presidium and Central Committee - has plenty of enemies - and live "purgees" - who don't like him or his policies.

Also military resent sharp reductions and over 100,000 officers will have to find work in factories or fields.

I am making no predictions as yet but Khrushchev in some trouble. He has bounce and ability. But he will need both as he is off balance.

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XII. Frustrated Dictator is dangerous. They badly miscalculate our public opinion - /= Remember Mikoyan away =/

We have every reason to be on our guard - Khrushchev may feel should try restore prestige by some sort of reaction in foreign field - or get his Chinese allies active first - to test the temperature and to await our elections.

Time for vigilance -

But when history is written it may be deemed a bonus that at this time we have had insight to the hard side of Khrushchevs character and to the dangers of summitry.

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